Showing posts with label culture. Show all posts
Showing posts with label culture. Show all posts

Friday, 23 June 2017

Bootstrapping culture in government


by James McKinneyRSS / cpsrenewalLinkedIn / James McKinneytwitter / James McKinney


When I started to work in government last year, I discovered that little was documented in a clear, accessible, or easy-to-discover way. This was especially common when it came to tasks that are done once (like getting a key card) or that have no business value (like accessing bike cages). The main way of sharing knowledge was word of mouth—or ‘lore’. Alternatively, instead of gaining knowledge to do something yourself, you asked others to do it for you (like asking the IT help desk). The government-wide onboarding information was about compliance (accessibility, safety, etc.), and the ministry-specific onboarding information was about roles and responsibilities. Nothing explained how to actually do anything.

So I started documenting everything.

Although everyone agrees that documentation is important, that belief—even strongly held—doesn’t translate into a culture of documentation. You need to be surrounded by a culture for its customs to become natural to you. My reason for documenting everything I encountered wasn’t a completionist obsession; it was a deliberate strategy to create that surround. For example: If you spend your first day at a new job working through a well-written onboarding guide, you come to expect that future tasks will be well documented. With that expectation, when you encounter a new task, your instinct will be to look for documentation, rather than find an expert to pass on the oral history of installing printers. If you see a large catalog of how-to guides on your team’s wiki, you intuit that the team has a practice of documentation. With that understanding, when you encounter a task that’s undocumented, you may consider documenting it yourself. In ways like this, members of a team can incorporate the value and custom of documentation.

People often quip that culture change in government is hard. Many efforts to change culture focus on policies and trainings and speeches and measures of performance. But those are the tools of maintaining and enforcing a culture. They are overt, hard, foreground gestures. To change beliefs, expectations, values, approaches, you need more covert, soft, broad interventions. You need to change the background to change the culture.

Changing the foreground (the policies and procedures) without changing the background (the beliefs and values) produces a culture where people know the words but not the music: a culture in which people self-censor and otherwise change their overt behaviour—in order to conform—without changing their beliefs or valuation of their work and colleagues. Silent, dutiful compliance is short of vocal, enthusiastic support.

The important opportunity here is that it doesn’t take everyone to change the background. You can bootstrap it. A small team, working full-time, can produce enough documentation to normalize it as a practice.

My earlier work on open data provides an example of bootstrapping a norm (of which cultures are made). In 2014, no municipality in Canada was publishing its elected officials’ contact information in a standardized machine-readable format. Over two years, I solicited 18 municipalities with open data initiatives to adopt a standard for this dataset, out of about 60 such municipalities. Today, municipalities starting open data initiatives adopt the standard independently. The standard has become part of the background. When a municipality looks at neighbours’ open data catalogs for inspiration, they see this dataset and the standard it uses. The question of whether to adopt is not even asked. In this case, it took one person’s work to establish one norm that is self-sustaining.

If you’re on a team that wants to change a culture in government, explore ways to make the practices and values that you want to instill across the the public service (like ‘putting users first’ if you work in digital) part of the background—the surround, the default, the assumption, the first example that comes to mind. Much of that relates to better documenting, communicating and supporting existing cases that exemplify those values. If you need to constantly win the same arguments until everyone who disagrees leaves or retires, you aren’t changing culture; you’re just outlasting.


Wednesday, 6 April 2016

Culture and risk


by Kent AitkenRSS / cpsrenewalFacebook / cpsrenewalLinkedIn / Kent Aitkentwitter / kentdaitkengovloop / KentAitken

"Culture, as the saying goes, eats strategy for breakfast, apparently it also eats technology, and probably has a taste for deliverology as well."
- Thom Kearney [You can change culture now]
The culture-eats-strategy theme was thickly present at last week's Canadian Open Dialogue Forum, a direction-setting conference about citizen engagement in Canada.

Citizen engagement is messy. It's uncertain. And it's in the open. So naturally, in lockstep with the culture-eats-strategy theme was the question of whether government is prepared for risks (real or perceived) associated with citizen engagement and open government.

Former Clerk of the Privy Council Wayne Wouters spoke about culture and risk, asking "How can you do something as a public service employee if you feel 'I'm breaking a rule'?" He disparaged the stock answer to mistakes in the public sector, which is to create a rule to ensure that X never happens again.

The problem is that any system, no matter how reliable, will generate errors with enough repetition - a fact that's at odds with a previous Clerk, Paul Tellier, who called for "an error-free administration." As Deputy Premier of Ontario Deb Matthews lamented, “We’re not allowed a failure on version 1.0 in government.” Unfortunately, that's the culture that has stuck.

A couple stories


Last year, a handful of public servants wrote a letter of praise, intending to send it to the managers of a colleague who'd been doing an amazing job and who was really helping out the broader community through sharing information and advice. When asking for signatories, a number of people said this: "This could backfire - collaboration may not be universally seen as  positive." That is, people were worried that drawing attention to an employee's collaborative, whole-of-government approach would diminish that person's standing in the organization.

Collaborative, networked, whole-of-government approaches are the strategy. Culture 1, strategy 0.

More recently. an NGO called In With Forward came to Ottawa to conduct a design lab with policymakers, exploring ways to support street-involved adults. From their blog:
We were testing what it would take to add ethnographic data to policy briefs. How could we give people in power direct access to the experiences of street-involved adults, and how could they use this information in the decision-making process? An oft repeated response was, “We can’t use stories. That’s not what we are asked to provide up the line. I wouldn’t even try to get it through the approval process.”
Design thinking, social innovation, and user research are part of the strategy. Culture 2, strategy 0.

What gives strategy something to chew on?


Ryan Androsoff and Xenia Menzies were exploring a possible hierarchy on Twitter throughout the conference: 

structure > incentives > culture > strategy

Strategy, in this model, has somewhat of an uphill battle. The left side, if poorly aligned with strategy, represents "organizational debt" that has to be addressed before you can make investments and start gaining ground (see: Nesta on Innovation in the public sector: Is risk aversion a cause or a symptom?)

Simply telling people that it's okay to take risks only works on the margins. And, like in the letter example, I'd even argue that it can backfire, leaving employees conflicted between what they're hearing and what they're experiencing.

Structural and systematic biases - in this case, a bias against risk - need structural and systematic responses. Governments have done this with Official Languages and Employment Equity, but we're never going to have a Key Performance Indicator for risk tolerance. Governments can't have risk quotas to meet (I'd dread the reporting: "We undertook 100 activities this year and 5% of them were classified as high-risk.")

Which means we need to dissect the structure, incentives, and culture to figure out the DNA of why public sector employees and executives make the decisions they do.

That said, in the meantime I'd propose a natural starting point: risk and hierarchies don't play well together. Short of calling for removing layers, I'd suggest that we revisit the assumption that hierarchies and decision-making chains have to be the same thing. In Australia, for instance, policy directors send advice and briefs directly to Ministers; the senior executives focus on coordination and administration. There are alternatives.

Wednesday, 17 February 2016

What has changed?

by Kent AitkenRSS / cpsrenewalFacebook / cpsrenewalLinkedIn / Kent Aitkentwitter / kentdaitkengovloop / KentAitken

Yesterday morning was pretty mild, but there was a storm watch in effect and a couple colleagues had emailed to say they were working from home. They were the people I’d have meetings with at work, so I set up a videoconference with screen-sharing for later that morning and stayed home too.

That’s not rocket science. Skype came out in 2003, and the Government of Canada has had WebEx accounts since before I joined in 2009. But in 2009 I wouldn’t have had email on my mobile to coordinate the meeting, wouldn’t have had access to documents at home, and I might not have been a contender for a WebEx account. Plus, as recently as last year I had a manager who generally just preferred to have everyone make to the office if they could.

It’s a relatively minor thing. The worst case scenario would have been a teleconference, or a delayed start so that people could get to the office. But it’s something that is simply different, culturally and technologically. Looking back, it’s something that has noticeably changed about my public service day-to-day.


Change isn’t quick


Way back on April 13, 2013, I wrote my first post on CPSRenewal.ca, titled What You’re Giving Now? You Can Never Give less. The idea was that today is your baseline for how much you’re contributing to your work, and your contribution is just going to keep getting more important. But you’ll be up for it.

At that time, I had just gone through an exercise of jotting down everything I had learned in the last five years and was surprised at how lengthy the list was. Really surprised. Our experience, knowledge, and competence build almost imperceptibly day over day, like children age, and it’s only when it’s brought to our attention do we realize how much has changed. It’s the same for the public service. For example, we collectively just did this exercise for the history of online communities in the Government of Canada (hat tip to Ryan Androsoff).

CPSRenewal.ca is about, well, public service renewal. How things keep changing. Sometimes, people talk about change or even make structural changes - and culture eats it for breakfast. Other times, without any particular guidance, things slowly shift and settle into a new equilibrium. Typically on this blog, I dissect those things that I think are changing too slowly. But if we started to list the changes, I think we'd surprise ourselves at how long the list would be.

What has changed?


My original plan was to pose the question purely rhetorically, but I'll add a more tangible option as well. I’ll invite you to add anonymous or attributed anecdotes in this What Has Changed doc, and I’d also welcome stories in the comments.







Wednesday, 22 April 2015

Innovation and Rigour


by Kent AitkenRSS / cpsrenewalFacebook / cpsrenewalLinkedIn / Kent Aitkentwitter / kentdaitkengovloop / KentAitken


There's a general rule in academic research: you know you're coming to the end of your literature review when you've already read all the references in the articles you're reading. The second line of defence is that this gets validated with an advisor who has been studying the field for decades.

We don't have that luxury in public administration, and particularly in public sector innovation. There's no such systematic record of experiential and practitioner knowledge. How do we know when we know enough about a skill, project, or field?


The four stages of competence

You may be familiar with the four stages of competence model for a given skill. The idea is that we start incompetent, but don't truly know it. We know so little about the skill that we can't even meaningfully assess our own ability: (1) unconscious incompetence. As we learn more, we realize how little we know, reaching (2) conscious incompetence. Eventually we become adept and know it, the level of (3) conscious competence. When we master something, we can do it on autopilot, without really thinking: (4) unconscious competence.

I wrote last week that, in general, people are probably unconsciously incompetent at facilitating online collaboration (see: The Promise of Online Collaboration). Which isn't trivial: if someone has a bad experience collaborating with a group, they'll disengage and not return (just as they would attending a poorly designed meeting or conference). So where we fit in this competence rubric for a given project is important. We're making decisions in the public trust. How do we know when we're prepared to do so? When to move forward rather than signal-checking with others or conducting additional research?


The dark side of experimentation

Experimenting is good. Experimenting without truly knowing what we're experimenting on is not: it leads people to skimp on the equivalent of the 'literature review' (what's been done before? Who can I talk to for advice?), skip setting markers to know if they're on the right track, and fail at critically assessing and sharing the knowledge gained (see: Standardizing Innovation).

It's tempting to use a baseline of zero: "Before we did X, nothing was happening, then we did X and something happened: ergo, success." Unconscious incompetence applies both to implementation and measurement. Falsely declaring success creates complacency (see: Pilot Projects and Problems). It slows the move towards competence. And it represents underdelivery.


Get meta about innovation

So what's the equivalent of academic rigour for public sector innovation? Could we work out useful heuristics to ask ourselves? Something like:
  • Who are the leaders in this field? What are they doing? Can I talk to them?
  • Could I give a hour-long presentation on this field tomorrow?
  • Where would this project fit in the Cynefin framework for problem complexity?
  • What will this project impact?Is the level of rigour in designing the project commensurate with its potential impacts? (Future prospects for the organization? Groups of stakeholders? How many people?) 
I don't know what would work, but I'd love to hear ideas. Because every time we try something that hasn't been done before and succeed, the culture needle moves a tiny bit from risk-adverse to innovative. Every time we fail, it wiggles back. We owe it to ourselves, our colleagues, the next generation of driven public servants, and to Canadians to be thoughtful and purposeful. But, also to avoid the dark side of being unnecessarily rigorous - one project's reckless abandon could be another's costly analysis paralysis.

This is the get meta about innovation: how do we move from asking ourselves Is this a good idea? to How do I know this is a good idea?

Wednesday, 3 December 2014

On Prescriptions for the Public Service


by Kent AitkenRSS / cpsrenewalFacebook / cpsrenewalLinkedIn / Kent Aitkentwitter / kentdaitkengovloop / KentAitken


I'd like to propose a new litmus test for how we consider changes. I hinted at it last week (see: Influence, Organizations, and Team Players), when I said that there could be a divide between the advice I'd give the public service writ large and the advice I'd give an individual that I care about.

But that divide has been on my mind for a while, in the context of this blog as well as the general advice public servants have been getting from many sources:


Consider, for example, this graphic from Destination 2020:


Source


Which lays out the "work from anywhere at anytime" and "more flexible" public service envisioned for 2020.

From the external Public Policy Forum (albeit with much input from public servants), we hear that public service leaders must be persuasive entrepreneurs:

"...leaders need to be able to break down complex ideas and convince others of the best course of action, especially when unpopular policies are being proposed."

Shrewd diplomats:

"...leaders need to work with elected officials and their own teams to ensure that accountability measures do not undermine innovation, productivity, or talent management. They must respect the pressures facing government, but also focus on building a high-performing public service."

And fearless advisors:

"[Leaders need to do] the right thing, regardless of the consequences..."

And generally speaking, I'd agree with all of this advice. But I have to admit that the rubric changes when I shift from thinking the public service should do X, Y, and Z to imagining giving advice to a close friend, a sibling, or a child who has just joined the public service.

Would I tell them to push for flexible work arrangements or leeway to collaborate with stakeholders and colleagues? To push back on senior leaders, whether political or public servant, to do the right thing? Or, to be a team player, to bide their time, to not rock the boat?

I suspect we'd all find instances of advice that we'd offer to crowds, but not to close relations. Which is not to say that we're hypocrites or liars. Rather, that culture is a lumbering beast to turn; and that we're not done yet.

Friday, 7 November 2014

On Influence and Hierarchy in Bureacracies


by Nick CharneyRSS / cpsrenewalFacebook / cpsrenewalLinkedIn / Nick Charneytwitter / nickcharneygovloop / nickcharneyGoogle+ / nickcharney

In bureaucracies we often mistake hierarchy as a proxy for influence.

But my view is that hierarchy is knowable, straightforward and discriminate, whereas influence is elusive, subtle and complex.

I consider hierarchy as akin to a hard power, influence as a soft power. And I've always been more interested in soft power then hard. My career path has been one of relationships over level and rewarding work over the greasy pole. My modus operandi (see: Scheming Virtuously: A Handbook for Public Servants) has never been about acquiring or pulling rank but rather building, safeguarding and levering reputation and ability to influence.

While I fully admit that sometimes influence flows from hierarchy and that those who ignore hierarchy ignore it at their peril (myself included), I also believe that it is increasingly the case that influence flows from some undefinable blend of serendipity, panache and resolve. I think we tend to prefer hierarchy because it offers the illusion of certainty and allows us to ignore the fact that influence is messy and that it can be neither poured neatly into an organizational chart nor contained within the strict limits of its boxes. And so our bureaucratic cultures continue to mistakenly treat hierarchy as a proxy for influence.

A likely example most would be familiar with is the Executive Assistant (EA) who is actually more like an Executive Director (ED) than an EA.

In my experience, many EAs don't have the rank they ought to. The ones worth their salt (and I've worked with many) are in fact more like EDs. Yes, they may have the tedious task of managing an executive's calendar but they are also the only ones trusted to do so; meaning that if you are the one requesting a meeting with your boss you are essentially at the mercy of the EA.

Now, it's easy to discount them but they have better access leadership and information flows than most - just by way of where they sit. The really good ones are easy to spot: they build skills and subject matter expertise, they sit at management tables, they have their boss's ear and they follow them from one job to another (and/or spend their entire careers in similar roles).

But I digress. All of this to say that the influence isn't a corollary of hierarchy and that many ignore that fact at their peril.

My hunch 

Actors without hard power tend to be better at wielding soft power because they have to, whereas those with hard power are weaker at wielding soft power because they don't. In other words, if hierarchy privileges you, you needn't worry as much about how to influence others, whereas if hierarchy doesn't benefit you, then you need to. As I'm reflecting on this I'm wondering if there is a tipping point (not in the Gladwellian sense) somewhere along your career trajectory where your levers and/or approach changes because there are suddenly more people below you than above you within the system.

This is not a slight to those on either side of the divide, nor do I think it's a hard and fast rule. It is an observation that may explain some of the interpersonal dynamics at play within bureaucracies that so many people find bothersome; namely, executives pulling rank on folks without it and/or folks without rank disrespecting and side-stepping the hierarchy.

What do you think?

Friday, 22 August 2014

Are Public Servants Interchangeable?

by Nick CharneyRSS / cpsrenewalFacebook / cpsrenewalLinkedIn / Nick Charneytwitter / nickcharneygovloop / nickcharneyGoogle+ / nickcharney

On Tuesday I attended IPAC's Summer Policy Conference on the New Government Leader. I was a participant, a panellist and a sponsor; life's complicated and lines are blurred but that's neither here nor there. During the course of the day there were a number of threads that wound themselves through the conversations. The one that seemed to be of the most interest was that of interchange (and the suite of related issues such as talent management). Uncharacteristically, I bit my tongue as the conversations unfolded, and when I had the mic as a panellist I offered to share some thoughts on the matter. Since the focus of the panel was on collaboration, data analytics and networked policy development, no one took me up on my offer, though some people did approach me afterwards. Here are my thoughts:

On the whole, interchange is a great program; at least is has been for me thus far. It was an opportunity to try something new, lose some baggage and rediscover the art of the possible. The deal took a long time to get inked and there were some minor complications, but once there was agreement on terms, it was a fairly straightforward process.

What I found fascinating about the discussion was that despite the fact that everyone is so quick to admit that the public service has lost its monopoly on policy advice – which again, I take as a proxy for influence (See: Is Innovation is Service Delivery a Blind Spot in Canada) – they are so beholden to working within it. In other words, while everyone seemed interested in using the interchange program to gain outside experience, their interest is tempered by a palpable reticence to simply pursue the experience on their own accord; leaving the public service is off the table.

Now, don't mistake my observation. I knowingly make it from the privileged position of having already secured an interchange and I fully admit that I was reluctant to report to my new employer before the interchange ink was dry. There's something cultural here worth exploring, when even the heretics among us are reticent to walk away. In other words, does this cultural homogeneity consistency lend itself more readily to the question of whether or not public servants interchangeable, rather than the question of whether or not they ought to go on interchange?

Friday, 15 November 2013

GCPEDIA: A David Among Goliaths

by Nick CharneyRSS / cpsrenewalFacebook / cpsrenewalLinkedIn / Nick Charneytwitter / nickcharneygovloop / nickcharneyGoogle+ / nickcharney


Last week I picked up Malcom Gladwell's latest book, David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits and the Art of Battling Giants, and crushed it over the course of a couple of days*. The book explores the power asymmetries between incumbents and upstarts and how successful upstarts exploit those asymmetries by engaging in unconventional tactics. The book takes its title from the biblical story of David and Goliath and is a deeper look at a phenomenon he wrote about for the New Yorker in 2009 about an otherwise untalented basketball team that started to dominate when the coach decided to employ a full court press.

If I had to boil down the essence of the book it would be this: David (the underdog) loses when he battles Goliath (the incumbent) according to Goliath's rules; however if/when David refuses to play by Goliath's rules, he greatly increases his chances of success.

The argument is compelling and seems to makes sense intuitively (and perhaps in my case experientially) but is it a lens that can be applied to the organizational context, and if so what examples could be used to illustrate the case?

GCPEDIA: A David among Goliaths

The project's success to date is due in no small part to the fact that it (and its administrators, stewards and advocates) have chosen to pursue paths that the Goliath mindset would otherwise have ignored: it's open source, offers users no ability to lock out others from their content, is housed in a department that technically doesn't have the mandate to house it, is supported by a small and highly dedicated (mission driven) team, and remains the only universally accessible zero barrier to entry collaboration solution within the Government of Canada. It sits in stark contrast to departmental solutions to collaboration, many of which are costly, license heavy software(s) that offer users the ability to restrict access to their content and tend to be administered by large administrative bodies who are seized with administering the administrivia of the administration (if you get my meaning).

Having been close to the project during its early years, keeping an eye on it, and knowing a number of people close to the project today, I can say with some degree of certainty - and without compromising anyone's confidence - that the project's core challenge is and always has been seen as how do we, borrowing Gladwell's language, transform this David into a Goliath. How do we take this thing that has been successful not because of the rules but in spite of them, into something more stable? How do we take GCPEDIA from an upstart to an incumbent?

What I find absolutely fascinating is the related fact that GCPEDIA disintermediates so many of our traditional power structures - hierarchy, geography, group and level, ministry, etc - that it is not only a David among Goliaths but rather that it enables Davids to rise up among the Goliaths. It provides an alternative path to non-traditional sources of power, influence and opportunity by allowing peoples' work to break out of its normal constraints and be easily shared with the organization writ large and be put to use by any one of the 250,000+ individuals working across the enterprise.

This is precisely one of the points that Nicco Mele argues in his book (similarly titled) The End of Big: How the Internet Makes David the New Goliath (which, incidentally, we reviewed here), that many of the technologies being built today have an inherently anti-institutional ethos built right into them and thus reinforces that type of culture - a culture of upstarts that is fundamentally at odds with the traditional cultures of hierarchy.

After thinking it through, I can't help but see some sort of connection between the fact that while GCPEDIA may be a David among Goliaths, its under-tapped potential is to enable Davids among Goliaths, and that ultimately even if it is successful, our cultural upstarts will ultimately face the same challenge as our technological ones: how to scale.


*Despite being familiar with Gladwell's work and the theses of his books (which have penetrated the mainstream due in part to his popular narrative style), I never actually took the time to read any of his books. After reading David and Goliath, I have since read both Outliers and Blink and am in the middle of Tipping Point.